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Sub-Saharan Africa ranks among the top regions in terms of growth in the number of
mobile phone users. The success of mobile telephony is attributed to the opening of markets
for private players and lenient regulatory policy. However, markets may be increasingly
saturated and new regulations introduced across Africa could also have a negative impact on
future growth. Since 2006, the majority of countries in the region have introduced mandatory
registration of users of prepaid SIM cards with their personal identity details. This potentially
increases the costs of using mobile telephony. I present a ￿xed e⁄ects model for the estimation
of the impact of mandatory registration on mobile penetration growth, which is based upon
a panel dataset of 32 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the years 2000 to 2010. The results
show that the introduction of mandatory registration depresses growth in mobile penetration.
JEL-Classi￿cation: L96, L98, D18.
Keywords: Telecommunication; government policy; consumer protection; privacy.
￿The author is indebted to a number of people for their review and helpful suggestions. These are in particular
Tobias Schmidt, Susan Steiner, Yiannis Theodorou, and Pio Baake. Moreover, for the provision of data, the
author thanks Jenny Aker and Christoph Stork. The paper presents preliminary results, comments are welcome.
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1 1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile phone usage is regarded as one of the economic success stories in Africa. According to
a report of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the mobile industry invested
US$ 35 billion between 2000 and 2011, providing more than 67 percent, or 500 million people
in Sub-Saharan Africa with mobile coverage (International Telecommunication Union [ITU],
2011, p. 65). According to ITU statistics, growth rates in mobile cellular subscriptions per 100
inhabitants (2005-2010) were on average about 44 percent p.a. across 47 Sub-Saharan African
countries, excluding Guinea and South Sudan. However, growth rates might cool o⁄ noticeably
in the near future. The reason could be a new measure introduced in more than half of Sub-
Saharan countries: the mandatory registration of users of mobile phones with personal details
for prepaid SIM cards. Such registration had not been conducted in the past, but is now required
by many governments in response to rising crime and fraud schemes involving mobile phones.
The main justi￿cation for the measure is to combat crime, to prevent fraud and to support Anti-
Money Laundering and the Combating of the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) measures.
Registration policies were ￿rst introduced in 2006 in both Senegal and Mauritius. In 2008
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan followed suit and imple-
mented similar policies. After these early adopters, a wave of more than 20 countries followed
in 2009 and 2010. The initiative is lead in the East African Community by the Assembly of
Telecommunications Operators at the East African Communications Organisation (EACO), an
intergovernmental body of telecom regulators, telecom and postal operators. It is reported in the
African media that this required registration might negatively a⁄ect mobile subscriber growth
rates.1 For example, registration could lead to the disconnection of millions of SIM cards, as
Africans struggle to assemble the required formal identity documentation. Moreover, there could
be also a negative impact on the operators￿revenues as mandatory registration leads to an imme-
diate drop in the number of active SIM cards after the registration deadline passes. The measure
may also in￿ uence telecom operators￿competition by increasing switching costs. For consumers,
the services will become personalized in future, because they are no longer anonymous. Gow
and Parisi (2008, p. 65-66) note that it is, in general, di¢ cult to achieve total anonymity in
mobile telephony, therefore the term anonymity is used herein to represent ￿ non-registration,￿
i.e. the absence of speci￿c personal identity information. Registration will also alter the types
1AfricaNews.com (2010).
2of crime encountered in the markets with a predictable increase in identity-related crimes. In
order to estimate the impact of mandatory registration on mobile penetration growth, a ￿xed
e⁄ects model is estimated controlling for GDP growth and governance variables as well as mar-
ket saturation. The model is estimated using a panel dataset of 32 African countries for the
years 2000 to 2010. The hypothesis tested is that mandatory registration negatively impacts on
mobile phone penetration growth. The evidence should be regarded as preliminary considering
that policy changes were only introduced starting in 2006. There is little known about the
impact of mandatory registration of prepaid SIM card users in Africa, and the sheer size of the
markets merit investigation. This article, therefore, ￿lls a void at the intersection of di⁄erent
literature strands. There is a vast literature on mobile phone di⁄usion in Africa such as Aker
and Mbiti (2010), ITU (2011) and Minges (1999), to name but a few. Moreover, there is some
analytical work on customer loyalty, switching costs and churn in post-paid mobile telephony
services in industrialized countries (Chuang, 2011; Maicas, Polo & Sese, 2009). However, the
author is not aware of academic studies estimating the impact of mandatory user registration
in Europe on prepaid services. Moreover, in Africa the prepaid market segment is much larger
than in Europe￿ such that one would expect more pronounced e⁄ects in Africa. There is a small,
yet growing, technical literature on churn prediction in prepaid telephony services (Dasgupta,
Singh & Viswanathan, 2008; Owczarczuk, 2010). However there appear to be no studies on
mandatory registration and its impact on competition among telecom operators.
This paper is not intended to be a full-scale cost-bene￿t analysis of mandatory registration,
because registration was only relatively recently introduced. The bene￿ts of such measures are
typically stressed by governments to improve the detection of crime and fraud in law enforcement.
At this stage, there is no convincing empirical evidence that mandatory registration in fact
systematically lowers crime rates. Another bene￿t stressed is that registration could improve
the migration of prepaid customers to mobile ￿nancial services for which customers have to
be identi￿ed. On the other hand, there are drawbacks associated with this policy. In the
past, anonymous prepaid services induced little loyalty to a speci￿c network because it was
easy to switch to another operator￿ s network. Mandatory registration, however, could increase
a customer￿ s switching costs, because a customer has to register with each operator. Less
switching impacts consumer privacy, as the personal pro￿le with the selected operator becomes
more detailed and complete. Increased switching costs cushions competition and reduce price
3discipline if consumers do not foresee that they will be potentially locked-in once they registered.
In an experimental study conducted for the European Network and Information Security Agency,
Jentzsch, Preibusch and Harasser (forthcoming), it is found that there is little switching between
two ￿rms after consumers ￿lled out an online form with their personal details with one of the
￿rms. In addition to these e⁄ects, customer registration could give rise to huge amounts of
personal data collected in Africa, i.e. the real-time location of users who are now identi￿ed.
2 The Rising Trend of Customer Registration
Registration of users of prepaid mobile telephony is conducted in some OECD countries, but
not all. The Center for Policy, Research on Science and Technology Registration (Center for
Policy Research on Science and Technology [CPRST], 2006) surveyed such policies in the OECD
in 2006. It reports that, at the time of the survey, 16 of 25 responding nations did not have
mandatory registration policies in place including Austria, Canada, Denmark and the United
Kingdom. Other countries introduced registration relatively recently: One example is Greece,
which introduced the policy in late 2009.2 There are no international comparisons related to
African countries, despite the success of mobile telephony there. The lack of systematic data on
Africa could be a reason why the trend of mandatory registration has received little attention
in the literature and in international discussions about mobile banking.3 In the following, the
rationale of mandatory registration is discussed and evidence on its spread across Africa is
presented. An overview of introduced registration measures in Africa is presented in Table (1),
which also contains information on the country sample used herein.
2.1 The Procedure and Rationale of Mandatory Identi￿cation
The ITU states that there is neither o¢ cial policy recommendation nor any other guideline on
the obligation to conduct mandatory registration of prepaid SIM card users.4 In May 2010,
the East African Communications Organization (East African Communications Organization
2It is reported in the media that the main operators in the country have seen declines in their customer base
(Wood, 2010). In Greece, the economic downturn is also contributing to a decline in consumer spending.
3For example, in Chatain, Zerzan, Noor, Dannaoui, and de Koker (2011) the trend is mentioned on p. 49 and
again in footnote 32, p. 60, but nothing is said about its extent. Most surprisingly, this also holds for ITU (2011).
4Personal communication with the author (August 4, 2011).
4[EACO], 2010, p. 17) acknowledged a report from the Assembly of Telecommunication Operators
proposing a subscriber registration deadline of June 2012. This assembly is the body of the
telecom operators located at the EACO, an intergovernmental body of telecom regulators as
well as telecom and postal operators in East Africa. EACO is in charge of promoting and
harmonizing the development of telecommunications and postal services across the East African
Community. While some countries apply laws and regulations, there are others where telecom
operators do registration voluntarily (Kenya) or based upon a recommendation of the regulatory
body (Burundi). But this kind of information is only available for a few countries. From a user￿ s
perspective it does not matter whether the operator does it ￿ voluntarily￿or not, what matters
is that he/she must register in order to use the service. Therefore, all registration measures
are labeled herein as ￿ mandatory registration,￿because access to the service is conditioned on
identi￿cation. Governments have put forth that mandatory registration is necessary for more
e⁄ective detection and prosecution of crime. As Gow and Parisi (2008) explain, the central
assumption is that customer data retained in a database by the operator is accessible to law
enforcement agencies. However, these authors conclude that there are signi￿cant problems with
the claim that mandatory registration of prepaid phone service is an e⁄ective course of action.
There are essentially no robust empirical studies that show that such measures make a di⁄erence
in terms of crime detection as criminals have a number of ways of circumventing the rules.
Mandatory registration is a procedure whereby individuals need to go through a process of
registering a prepaid SIM card for their mobile phone in their name. The process resembles
Know-Your-Customer (KYC) procedures, which are conducted by traditional targets of money
laundering such as banks, insurance companies or casinos. KYC procedures are part of inter-
national AML/CFT framework set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In fact some
commentators have complained that, ￿In some instances the requirement to become a prepaid
GSM customer is more rigorous than that to open a bank account in the same market!￿(Scan-
lon, 2010, p. 43). In other cases, these procedures might be so lax that it defeats their very
purpose. Whether a registration procedure is e⁄ective depends on how strict the measure is
enforced and whether identi￿cation is based on proper due diligence of the employees of telecom
operators.
According to KYC procedures there needs to be formal documentation and veri￿cation of
the identity of the customer, i.e. customers need to provide personal details such as name,
5physical address and contact details before an institution enters into a business relationship
with the customer. Where possible, the identity of the individual needs to be veri￿ed based
upon government-issued identity cards or comparable documents. Where individuals cannot
provide proof of physical address, for example, when they live in informal settlements, other
measures may apply. In the following, South Africa, Nigeria, and Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) serve as examples.
2.2 Registration Procedures in Three African Countries
In South Africa, mandatory registration of prepaid cards became e⁄ective 1 July 2009 with
the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication (RICA).
An original deadline by the end of 2010 was postponed to mid-2011. The process sparked a
discussion in the country and in fact led to the creation of a new word, a verb, because users
were asked by their telecom operators to ￿RICA their SIM cards.￿ Users must provide their
name and surname, and bring proof of identity in the form of an identity document or passport,
as well as a proof of a physical address in the form of either a bank statement or utility bill.
Persons living in informal settlements may bring a letter/a¢ davit from a school, church or nearby
retail store. The registration has to be done face-to-face with RICA-agents. The Department
of Communications reported more than 37 million users or about 95 percent of mobile phone
users, had registered by June 2011.5
In Nigeria, the Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC) embarked on a mission to have
all mobile phone subscribers in the country registered by the end of 2011. The NCC explains
on its website that the rationale for the measure is an increase in security and better statistical
analysis of phone usage as well as to ￿enable operators to have a predictable pro￿le about the
users in their networks.￿ 6 According to the draft ￿ regulations for the registration of telephone
subscriber￿of 2011, telecom operators must capture biometric and other personal data of sub-
scribers. Biometric data refers to ￿ngerprints and picture and personal information to name,
gender, date of birth as well as residential address and nationality. Non-compliance by the oper-
ators is punishable with ￿nes. By February 2011, the NCC reported that 11 million SIM cards
5Sources are for numbers are the following reports: For South Africa it is NetNews Publisher (2011); for Nigeria
it is Balancing Act (2011).
6See website of the NCC: http://www.ncc.gov.ng/sim-registration/about-simreg.html
6were registered, and the procedure was supposed to be completed by 28 September 2011. By
November 2011, newspaper reports in Nigeria cited the NCC￿ s Vice-Chairman Eugene Juwah
with the statement that 93 million mobile lines had been registered (Telegeography 2011).
In the DRC, the regulations on registration measures hold in Article 5 that nationals need to
be identi￿ed with an identity card or equivalent document (passport, driver￿ s license, electoral
card or student card).7 Moreover, in a related regulation, it is stated that individuals must
provide their name, physical address, nationality, as well as their date and place of birth. This
information, recorded on a form, must be signed and dated by the subscriber, who is legally
held liable in case of false declarations (Article 4 b of the modi￿cation of the aforementioned
regulations).8 Moreover, it is forbidden to identify persons only by means of telephone, SMS,
or electronic courier (Article 2). In case of name changes, updating is legally required. While
there is only a limited overview of di⁄erent regulations at this stage, the Congolese seem to be
more rigorous and speci￿c in the required procedures and the consequences of non-compliance
when compared to those in other countries. Yet, the DRC is more politically instable than many
of the countries sampled herein. There is no information available on whether the regulators
rigorously enforce the registration procedures. This is discussed in greater detail in the section
on data caveats.
3 Impact of User Registration
One of the most important questions is whether the identi￿cation procedures required by manda-
tory registration a⁄ects the distribution and growth rates of mobile telephony in Africa countries.
The panel dataset presented herein facilitates a better ￿although preliminary ￿understanding
of the interactions.
3.1 Aggregate Statistics
Of the 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa displayed in Table (1) in the Appendix, con￿rmed
information about existence or non-existence of registrations could be found for 32 countries.
7ArrŒtØ interministØriel n
￿ 25/CAB/MINETAT/ INTERDESEC/010/2008 et n
￿003 CAB/MIN/PTT/2008 du





CAB/MIN/PTT/011/2009 du 21 dØcembre 2009 modi￿ant et complØtant l￿ ArrŒtØ interministØriel n
￿
25/CAB/MINETAT/INTERDESEC/010/2008 et n
￿ 003/CAB/ MIN/PTT/2008 du 08 mars 2008 ￿xant
les conditions de souscription ￿ l￿ abonnement tØlØphonique en RØpublique DØmocratique du Congo.
7Information for the other 16 countries was sought as well, but no indication of such a policy was
found. This allows two conclusions: (a) either there is no such policy in the other countries, where
the dummy can be set to zero for the years 2000 to 2010; or (b) there could be measures, but there
is no publicly available information. The models are estimated based upon the assumption (b),
i.e. the con￿rmed sample. Of the 32 con￿rmed countries, 29 introduced mandatory registration
during the period under observation. In Table (2), the succession of these countries is displayed,
showing a surge of reformers in 2009 and 2011.
INSERT Table 2 here.
In Fig.1, the percentage of prepaid subscribers in total mobile cellular subscriptions is plotted
against GDP per capita (in Purchasing Power Parity in USD) for 2008. It is important to note
that prepaid mobile phone subscriptions are active SIM cards and not the number of natural
persons subscribing ￿such caveats of the data are discussed in greater detail below.
Figure 1: Share of Prepaid Subscriptions against GDP per capita (2008)
Source: ITU and CIA World Fact Book. All variables and sources are included in Table 1 in the
Appendix. The Seychelles were dropped for this Figure.
The cluster of countries in the upper left corner shows that the majority of countries with low
8GDP per capita have high shares of prepaid subscriptions out of total mobile phone subscriptions.
The ITU (2011, p. 22) notes that the
￿introduction of prepaid billing in 1996 brought mobile to the masses. There are millions
of people around the world who would not qualify for a post-paid mobile plan, let alone be
able to a⁄ord the required monthly payments. The majority of subscriptions in developing
countries are prepaid, and in Least Developed Countries, where income levels are particularly
low, 94 per cent of subscriptions were prepaid at the end of 2009.￿
Another reason for the success is the reduced paperwork that came with prepaid SIM cards,
as, at the time, no registration was necessary for these cards. Before we proceed some notes on
data caveats are indicated. As noted by other authors, these data come with caveats. ITU ￿gures
map mobile subscriptions and therefore potentially overestimate the number of mobile phone
users in African countries, because individuals might hold several SIM cards (Aker & Mbiti, 2010,
p. 210). Regarding such ownership, Research ICT Africa (2008), a household survey conducted
in di⁄erent African countries, reports that 36.3 percent of adults (16 years+) hold more than one
SIM card in Benin, 25.8 percent in Kenya, and only 2.9 percent in Mozambique.9 These datasets
are unfortunately not available across the panel used for the estimations presented in this article.
It must be noted that measurement error in the dependent variable can cause attenuation bias,
which makes it more di¢ cult to detect an e⁄ect. While ITU data has severe limitations, it is the
only dataset available for the time period under analysis. Follow-up research would need to use
household-level data. The problem is that surveys, such as FinScope or Research ICT Africa,
do not ask respondents whether or not they registered their SIM cards with telecom operators.
Unfortunately, there is no information available on whether the regulators in the di⁄erent
countries rigorously enforce the registration procedures. Regulatory quality must, therefore, be
approximated with another variable, Regq_est, in the estimations, which is discussed in section
3.3. Therefore the level of generality existing in the data collection presented herein is whether
mandatory registration exists or not. Further information collection would entail interviewing
telecom operators and regulators to produce primary data on the level of enforcement quality.
The regulators typically set tight deadlines for registration. This means that within a speci￿c
period, all existing users must register their SIM cards and that all new customers must also
9These are results from a household survey on ICT access and usage conducted in 12 African countries at the
end of 2007/beginning of 2008.
9be identi￿ed. Once the deadline passes, active unregistered SIM cards are deactivated. This
means regulatory measures are e⁄ective after the deadline expires. Once the deadline passes,
the number of active SIM cards should be a⁄ected. It is reported across many African countries
that millions of active SIM cards were deactivated (Musarurwa, 2011). As mentioned, there is
no comparable information on whether the regulations are rigorously enforced by regulators in
di⁄erent countries. This can only the approximated by other variables and is, in fact, a future
research question.
3.2 Implications for Mobile Subscription Growth
Demand for ￿xed line or mobile services and economic growth are invariably linked in developing
countries (Garbacz & Thompson, 2007). But as several of African countries have experienced
rather high growth rates in the past, cooling o⁄might be simply be due to market saturation. In
the regressions presented below, both market saturation and governance indicators are controlled
for. There should be two immediate e⁄ects with the establishment of mandatory registration:
(1) a decline in the levels of mobile cellular subscriptions due to disconnections after the dead-
line; and (2) a decline in the growth rates of penetration, i.e. the year-to-year changes in levels
of mobile cellular subscriptions due to the increasing access costs. In 2011, a decline in cellular
subscriptions was reported in C￿te d￿ Ivoire, Gabon, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.10 SIM card
disconnections have taken place in Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Ghana, and Kenya. In
Zimbabwe the three network operators disconnected a combined 2.4 million prepaid subscrip-
tions, according to the telecom regulator, such that the total number of mobile subscriptions
declined from around 8.4 to 6 million. Disconnections are expected to start in Nigeria starting
in 2012.
10See Balancing Act (2011). The article suggests that for Vodafone and MTN in South Africa there were
decreases in the number of active SIM cards, but revenue was not a⁄ected to the same extent as many of the
cards were zero-ARPU SIM cards. ARPU is the average revenue per user.
103.3 The Model
This section focuses on the growth in mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. For ease of
interpretation, year-to-year changes in mobile penetration are used as dependent variable. A
Fisher-type unit-root test (based upon Phillips-Perron tests) shows that the series ￿total active
mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants￿is non-stationary, i.e. integrated at the order of one in
levels. However, it is stationary in ￿rst di⁄erences ￿a conclusion drawn by other authors as well
(see Lam & Shiu, 2010). First-di⁄erencing this variable helps to avoid problems associated with
using levels as dependent variable. Here, estimation results for a baseline model with country
and year ￿xed e⁄ects (FE model) are presented in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Moreover, additional variables that also change over time are introduced to control for potential
in￿ uencing factors. The estimation results are based on the sample of 32 countries for which
information could be con￿rmed. In fact, estimating the models on the larger sample of 48
countries, with the uncon￿rmed countries set to zero does not change the results.
All variables and sources are described in detail in Table (3) in the Appendix. Equation
(1) presents the model, where yit is the dependent variable, i.e. the series of yearly changes in
mobile penetration, the individual country is denoted by i and the time is denoted by t in (1):
yit = ￿i + Xit￿1 + Zi￿2 + Dit￿3 + ￿4Tt + "it;i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng;t 2 f1;2;:::;Tig (1)
Moreover, ￿i(i = 1::::n) denotes the entity-speci￿c intercepts, Xit is a vector of time-varying
co-variates (regulatory quality, political stability, GDP growth, market saturation as well as
market liberalization); Zi is a vector of time-invariant covariates (dummies denoting countries);
Tt introduces dummies for the years and "it is the idiosyncratic error term. Dit is the dummy
variable of interest and a proxy for the ￿ e⁄ect-taking￿of the deadline of registration. This is a
time-varying dummy, which is 0 before the deadline, 0 during the calendar year in which the
deadline becomes legally binding and 1 in the following calendar year. There are two reasons
behind this approximation:
(1) In the majority of countries, the registration deadline lies in the second half of the year,
often in December, such that the binding character becomes e⁄ective only with the start of the
next year. In some countries, deadlines were postponed from the middle of the year to its end,
such that there was a delay in their binding character;
11(2) The second reason is that there are no quarterly data. Therefore, e⁄ects should only
show up in the data following the year, where registration became e⁄ective.
The hypothesis on the dummy￿ s coe¢ cient estimate is that once the deadline becomes e⁄ec-
tive, it negatively impacts in year-to-year growth in mobile penetration. The model is estimated
with binary dummies for n-1 countries and t-1 years. The inclusion of yearly dummies was
indicated by a Wald test.
In the Appendix, Table (4) presents the summary statistics and the correlation coe¢ cients
of the variables are displayed in Table (5). In order to control for di⁄erent in￿ uencing factors, a
number of independent variables were introduced, such as GDP growth, and governance indica-
tors such as regulatory quality, political stability, as well as liberalization of the telecom market
and the levels of mobile penetration as a proxy for market saturation. The results are presented
in Table (6) of the Appendix. For all models, it holds that Prob > F = 0:0000, which is the
F-test suggesting that all coe¢ cients are di⁄erent from zero.
The baseline model (Model 1) is parsimonious, because it only includes three independents:
GDP growth, market saturation and the dummy for mandatory registration. Models 2￿ 4 include
the additional controls. The coe¢ cient estimate on the dummy for mandatory registration is
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 5%-level and suggests a negative relationship. Consider
Model 4: as mandatory registration becomes e⁄ective, the dummy increases by one unit, which
in turn reduces year-to-year changes in mobile penetration by ￿ 4:6 mobile subscriptions per
100 inhabitants. This result is robust across di⁄erent model speci￿cations (i.e. across models
2-4) as well as for di⁄erent samples, as stated above. Introducing additional controls such as
telecom liberalization, regulatory quality or political stability does not change the result. If we
control for these variables, GDP growth turns out not to be signi￿cant.11 The other variable
that provides a positive contribution to growth rates is the level of mobile subscriptions per 100
inhabitants, which is a proxy for market saturation. Its positive contribution might be due to
network externalities and greater coverage in more developed telecom markets.
11The literature is divided on how GDP growth is associated with penetration. Studies show that GDP per
capita is associated with mobile penetration (Banerjee & Ros, 2004; Waverman, Meschi & Fuss, 2005). In Banerjee
and Ros (2004) a negative correlation of GDP per capita and tele-density is found by applying panel data regression
for the years 1996 to 2000. This ￿nding con￿rms that the fastest growth in cellular density occurred in countries
with the lowest per capita GDP.
123.4 Robustness and Diagnostics
FE regression models are recommended where the changes in variables over time are of interest,
and where a control for unobserved heterogeneity is indicated. FE uses the relationship between
the variables within a country, where FE removes the e⁄ect of time-invariant factors from the
dependent variables in order to obtain their net e⁄ect. In order to decide between FE and
Random E⁄ects model, a Hausman test was conducted. The reported diagnostic results refer
to the full model (Model 4 in Table (6). The inclusion of time e⁄ects was decided based upon
a Wald test with the null hypothesis (H0) that no time ￿xed e⁄ects are needed. The test was
signi￿cant at the 5%-signi￿cance level, leading to the rejection of H0.
Potential cross-sectional dependence was analyzed by using the Pesaran CD test, which tests
whether residuals are correlated across countries. The test was not statistically signi￿cant, there-
fore H0 (￿ no cross-sectional dependence￿ ) could not be rejected. However, a modi￿ed Wald test
for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the FE model led to the rejection of H0 (￿ homoskedasticity￿ ),
indicating that a robust option should be used to estimate the model.12
Multicollinearity was investigated using Variance In￿ ation Factors (VIFs), as well collinearity
diagnostics in Stata, on the variables used for estimation. The decision rule for V IFs was
V IFs > 10 and for the collinearity diagnostics a Condition Number of 15. The statistics did
not indicate a severe multicollinearity problem. Moreover, when multicollinearity is a problem
coe¢ cient estimates tend to be instable if another sample is used. To check for their stability, the
model was re-estimated on the full sample and on two di⁄erent sub-samples, randomly drawn
from the con￿rmed sample. It was also re-estimated on a shorter time-period for the years 2008
to 2010. In essence, the results remain robust.13
Potential omitted variable bias was accounted for by introducing more variables in the model.
There cannot be the omission of time-invariant characteristics as the FE estimation method
controls for them. The conclusion drawn here is still preliminary considered the short time frame
of observation, but the results suggest that introducing mandatory registration (approximated
the deadline dummy) negatively a⁄ects year-to-year growth in the levels of mobile subscriptions
per 100 inhabitants. This con￿rms the intuition and should become more pronounced in future,
12In fact, it is not indicated to use the robust and cluster option together in the Stata FE estimation, therefore
the author chose clustered robust errors.
13These tests as well as the other diagnostic tests are available from the author upon request.
13as more data becomes available. In the following, some complementary insights on registration
and competition are presented.
3.5 Implications of Registration for Competition
Over the past years, the structure of telecom markets in Sub-Saharan Africa has changed tremen-
dously. In Aker and Mbiti (2010, p. 228) market structure analysis based upon Groupe SpØciale
Mobile Association (GSMA) data for the years 1995-2009 shows a large decline in monopolies
and an increase in the number of fully liberalized markets. By 2010, African telecom markets
were characterized as highly competitive, especially in the prepaid segment (Scanlon, 2010).
Customer identi￿cation procedures could potentially a⁄ect competition intensity, the reasons
being targeting e⁄orts and incentives to lock customers in, probably through loyalty programs.
Low loyalty intensi￿es price competition due to high rates of switching. Personal registration
for SIM cards bears upfront sunk costs for individuals. It has been noted that switching costs
increase competition during the ￿rst period (Klemperer, 1995; National Economic Research As-
sociates [NERA], 2003). If customers are sophisticated they will anticipate lock-in in the second
period. If they foresee such lock-in, rival operators must o⁄er them greater incentives to join
their network during the ￿rst period, which intensi￿es competition, before the lock-in takes
place. Customers are in fact often not sophisticated enough to anticipate such e⁄ects, because
this would require prepaid SIM card users to know about switching costs and future targeting
e⁄orts by operators (for a discussion on short-sighted decisions, see also Loewenstein (2000).
Apart from the time-costs and e⁄ort to show-up in person for registration, individuals might
have psychological costs related to the disclosure of personal data to a company. In fact, these
concerns are now reported in Africa.14 This would potentially introduce additional switching
obstacles, based upon trust.
Many operators in industrialized countries develop strategies to avoid churn, because the
costs of customer acquisition are greater than the costs of existing customer retention. Compe-
tition strategies of telecom operators change noticeably once growth rates do not compensate
for churn anymore. In the future, the collection of personal data on customers will open greater
possibilities for operators with respect to their competition strategies in the prepaid segment.
Operators can now identify their prepaid customers and learn more about them with pro￿ling in
14See Malakata (2010).
14order to create distinct marketing approaches for di⁄erent customer segments (Levisse, Manuel
& Sjolund, 2008). This helps to eliminate costly and ine⁄ective blanket promotions. In fact, it
is reported from South Africa that after the introduction of registration, Vodacom managed to
reduce prepaid churn from 48.1 percent in the third quarter of 2008 to 38.1 percent in the third
quarter of 2009. ￿Customer registration together with focused loyalty programmes has resulted
in overall improvement of prepaid churn for the operator.￿(Scanlon, 2010, p. 43). Pro￿ling
prepaid customers allows churn prediction ￿an interesting area of future research (Dasgupta et
al. 2008; Owczarczuk, 2010). To the knowledge of the author, there is, as of 2011, no academic
literature on churn prediction in African prepaid markets. While churn occurs for many reasons,
the switching to a competitor￿ s network just being one of them, a decline should be noticeable
in the period following mandatory registration.
The migration of customers to other services within the same network will be easier once
they have registered. Consider mobile money and post-paid telephony. The identity information
required for both is similar to that required for pre-paid SIM card registration. Customer
graduation to mobile money reduces churn: It is reported for Smart￿ s money transfer in the
Philippines that users of mobile money have a monthly churn rate of 0.5 percent compared to 3
percent for non-users (Scanlon, 2010, p. 44). Clustering of services with one provider increases
the costs of switching to another, just as registration does. Moreover, if pro￿table prepaid
customers can be identi￿ed, such customers can be migrated more easily to post-paid services,
where a greater rent can be extracted by the telecom operator, because of reduced salience
of costs. A recent study ￿nds that prepaid customers at a northern European mobile service
provider are more sensitive to average costs than post-paid customers, because salience of costs
depends on the payment mechanism (Pirc, 2008). Increased price insensitivity in turn lowers
price discipline. Again, the author has not found any academic studies on the competitive impact
of registration in industrialized countries, which could act as guidepost. However, with respect
to the competitive implications one could cautiously conclude that mandatory registration could
be in the interest of telecom operators, as long as customers are not sophisticated, because it
potentially lowers switching rates. Such lower rates also have an impact on consumer privacy:
The lower the switching rate, the more integrated the pro￿le becomes with the chosen operator.
Registration bears costs for consumers and additionally raises concerns about location privacy:
in future movement patterns can be more precisely linked to an individual identity.
154 Conclusions
There is a noticeable trend of mandatory registration of users of prepaid SIM cards in Sub-
Saharan Africa. More than 30 countries have started or are planning to register users of prepaid
SIM cards. One immediate e⁄ect of registration is that the number of active cellular subscriptions
drops due to disconnections. Moreover, penetration growth, measured as year-to-year changes
in levels of mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants are depressed due to increased
paperwork. Customer identi￿cation can become, in particular, a constraint in countries with an
insu¢ cient identi￿cation infrastructure, if no alternative methods for identi￿cation are allowed.
The share of prepaid subscriptions out of total subscriptions is, on average, around 97 percent
for the sampled countries. The sheer size of the markets, therefore, merits a preliminary analysis
of potential e⁄ects of mandatory registration.
Considered that changes were introduced only recently, the presented results are of a more
preliminary character. Herein, evidence derived from a new panel dataset on 32 countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa and penetration growth between 2000 and 2010 is presented. The FE
model estimated herein controls for market saturation, political stability, regulatory quality,
GDP growth rates as well as liberalization of the market. I use a proxy for the e⁄ectiveness of
mandatory registration, which is a dummy of zero in the year of the deadline of registration,
which switches to one the following year. The coe¢ cient estimate carries the expected sign as
direction of e⁄ect (negative) and cannot be contributed to chance at the 5% signi￿cance level.
Short-term and long-term e⁄ects should be separated in future analyses: in the short-term
potentially mostly dormant SIM cards are cleaned out. But with strict enforcement of identity
veri￿cation by operators and an insu¢ cient identi￿cation system, growth in mobile penetration
could be also tamed in the long run. However, we need more years of observation or quarterly
data in order to obtain further con￿rmation of the preliminary results presented herein.
Future work could contribute to a better understanding of the e⁄ects by building a theory of
mandatory registration under competition in markets with network e⁄ects and consumers with
privacy concerns. Consumer privacy concerns could exacerbate switching costs, if a consumer is
not willing to share personal data with more than one operator. This is, of course, a trade-o⁄,
because the pro￿le will become more complete at that provider.
The presented research opens a host of new questions: There are currently no works on
mandatory registration of users in Europe and its impact on prepaid services. Such research
16would involve an extra e⁄ort of collecting information on regulations and prepaid subscriptions.
Virtually no work exists on the impact of customer registration on rates of switching and com-
petition among operators. More e⁄ort needs to be invested in a better understanding of legal
protection and enforcement of mobile privacy in Africa. And much more e⁄ort needs to be
invested in the collection of information on the design of registration procedures, strictness,
enforcement and monitoring. This could lead to the creation of new variables that could be
introduced into estimations. This paper can only be regarded as a ￿rst step into this area
of research. A striking outcome derived from the screening of household surveys in Africa is
that none asks respondents questions about registration and their privacy concerns. Another
important point is that there is currently little empirical evidence that mandatory registration
leads to a reduction of crime. There are ways of circumventing registration either by presenting
fraudulent IDs, conducting identity theft, by stealing or swapping of phones. This casts doubts
on the e⁄ectiveness of the measures with respect to their very rationale. Regulators should more
more thoroughly analyze the costs and bene￿ts of mandatory registration, because these could
a⁄ect market dynamics in unintended ways.
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20Table 1: Mandatory Registration Measures in Sub-Saharan Africa
No Country Start year registration Deadline registration
1 Angola ... ...
2 Benin 2010 2010
3 Botswana 2008 2009
4 Burkina Faso 2008 2011
5 Burundi 2011 2011
6 Cameroon 2009 2009
7 Cape Verde ... ...
8 Central African Rep. 2009 ...
9 Chad 2011 2011
10 Comoros ... ...
11 Congo, Dem. Rep. 2008 2009
12 Congo, Republic of 2011 2011
13 C￿te d￿ Ivoire 2009 2010
14 Djibouti ... ...
15 Equatorial Guinea ... ...
16 Eritrea ... ...
17 Ethiopia ... ...
18 Gabon 2010 2010
19 Gambia 2011 2011
20 Ghana 2010 2011
21 Guinea ... ...
22 Guinea-Bissau ... ...
23 Kenya 2010 2010
24 Lesotho ... ...
25 Liberia 2011 2011
26 Madagascar ... ...
27 Malawi No policy No policy
28 Mali ... ...
29 Mauritania ... ...
30 Mauritius 2006 2006
31 Mozambique 2010 2010
32 Namibia No policy No policy
33 Niger 2009 2010
34 Nigeria 2011 2011
35 Rwanda 2012 2012
36 Sao Tome & Principe ... ...
37 Senegal 2006 2007
38 Seychelles 2009 2009
39 Sierra Leone 2009 2010
40 Somalia ... ...
41 South Africa 2009 2011
42 Sudan 2008 2008
43 Swaziland ... ...
44 Tanzania 2009 2009
45 Togo 2011 2011
46 Uganda 2011 2012
47 Zambia No policy No policy
48 Zimbabwe 2010 2010
21Table 2: Start Year of Mandatory Registration of Prepaid Subscribers
2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Senegal Botswana Cameroon Benin Burundi Rwanda
Mauritius Burkina Faso Central Afr. Rep. Gabon Chad
Congo, Dem. Rep. C￿te d￿ Ivoire Ghana Congo, Rep. of
Sudan Niger Kenya Gambia
Seychelles Mozambique Liberia
Sierra Leone Zimbabwe Nigeria
South Africa Togo
Tanzania Uganda
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Proxy for the e⁄ect the deadline of mandatory registration,
which is the year of the deadline plus one year to account
for e⁄ectiveness. Sources: News sources in English, French








This is a World Bank indicator, which re￿ ects the statisti-
cal compilation of responses on the quality of governance,
i.e. regulatory quality given by ￿rms, citizen and expert
respondents. The point estimate is measured in units rang-








This is a World Bank indicator, which re￿ ects the statistical
compilation of responses on the quality of governance, i.e.
political stability given by ￿rms, citizen and expert respon-
dents. The point estimate is measured in units ranging from









IV: Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. Num-
bers refer to active SIM cards and not to natural persons.







IV: The status of int. voice gateway licensing, compiled by
Paul Hamilton, where: 0 = Monopoly, 0.5 = Deregulated, 1
= liberalized. The author gratefully acknowledges the pro-
vision by Professor Jenny Aker. 2010 was completed by the
author by taking the 2009 value as proxy for 2010.
23Table 4: Summary Statistics on Con￿rmed Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
Level mob. penetration, D1
overall 5.339335 5.634017 -1.18 38.88 N = 316
between 2.666584 1.346 10.512 n = 32
within 4.97788 -5.412666 35.26634 T-bar = 9.875
GDP growth
overall .0076288 .1840797 -.9845185 .4950391 N = 350
between .0477134 -.0617628 .1179729 n = 32
within .177962 -.964814 .384695 T-bar = 10.9375
Level mob. penetration
overall 22.32908 26.94653 .02 135.91 N = 349
between 18.41839 3.84 79.92182 n = 32
within 19.86761 -24.60273 92.48545 T-bar = 10.9063
Regulatory quality
overall -.6024827 .6245589 -2.252721 .8468239 N = 320
between .6156691 -1.99866 .6131373 n = 32
within .1473755 -1.176835 -.0531604 T = 10
Political stability
overall -.5782193 .970055 -2.700543 1.189204 N = 320
between .9360896 -2.242817 .9215636 n = 32
within .299107 -1.995148 .4300014 T = 10
Telecom lib.
overall .5525568 .4537834 0 1 N = 352
between .2842412 0 1 n = 32
within .3569708 -.3565341 1.27983 T = 11
Dummy registration
overall .0482955 .214695 0 1 N = 352
between .0951626 0 .3636364 n = 32
within .1931218 -.3153409 .9573864 T = 11































.2124* .08 .3571* 1
Political
stability




.2066* .1992* .3071* -.0495 -.0435 1
Dummy
registration
.1148 .048 .3398* .1173 .0382 .1201 1




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Con￿rmed Sample Con￿rmed Sample Con￿rmed Sample Con￿rmed Sample
GDP
growth
6.7451411 9.1104322 9.118959 9.248009
(8.6056) (9.3691) (9.6135) (9.0876)
Level
mob.pentr.
.16545953*** .19547456*** .19545666*** .19509478***
(0.0439) (0.0449) (0.0453) (0.0469)
Dummy
reg.
-4.662463* -4.575469* -4.5789673* -4.5974388*













Constant .53735578 1.9191484 1.9104869 1.8348366
(0.7949) (2.1883) (2.2776) (2.0432)
Year ￿xed
e⁄ects
omitted omitted omitted omitted
Country
￿xed e⁄ects
omitted omitted omitted omitted
N 316 284 284 284
r2 .51837031 .51314905 .51314951 .51321716
r2_a .49929587 .49159108 .48970856 .48788274
26